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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Legislature extensively amended the provisions of the Flor-
ida Business Corporation Act ("FBCA") dealing with rights of appraisal first
in 2003,2 then again in 2004,' and 2005.4 The FBCA adopts, verbatim, the
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center of Nova Southeastern University; B.
A., Cornell University; J.D., Boston College. Professor Cane has served as Chair of the Cor-
porations/Securities Committee of The Florida Bar Business Law Section. She is a member of
the American Law Institute and a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation. Professor Cane
wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Ilya Torchinsky in the preparation of this
article.
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1. Benjamin Franklin, The Whistle, in Tim OXFORD BOOK OF AMERICAN ESSAYS 4, 6
(Brander Matthews ed., 1914) (emphasis added).
2. Act effective Oct. 1, 2003, ch. 2003-283, §§ 21-44, 2003 Fla. Laws 2902, 2914-31.
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language of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act ("RMBCA")
amendments with certain significant exceptions. The RMBCA amendments
in 1998 made major changes to appraisal procedures and terminology.' For
example, the RMBCA's new formulation does not use the term "dissenter"
and requires shareholders to "perfect" their claim by sending a "certification"
plus their stock certificates.'
The key distinction this article will address is that, whereas the RMBCA
explicitly states that "fair value" shall be computed "without discounting for
lack of marketability or minority status, 7 the FBCA limits this language to
apply only to a corporation with ten or fewer shareholders.
This could create an inference that in appraisal proceedings involving
corporations with more than ten shareholders, such discounts should apply.
As amended in 2003, the Florida statute eliminated the language concerning
discounting, breaking completely with the RMBCA model on this issue.9
Additionally, in 2005, the FBCA included RMBCA's concept of denying
discounts in appraisal proceedings, but only for corporations with ten or
fewer shareholders. 0
3. Act effective June 24, 2004, ch. 2004-378, 2004 Fla. Laws 2881.
4. Act effective June 20, 2005, ch. 2005-267, 2005 Fla. Laws 2425.
5. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Business Law, Proposed Changes in
the Model Business Corporation Act-Appraisal Rights, 54 Bus. LAW. 209, 209 (1998).
6. Id. at 238-39.
7. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 13.01(4)(iii) (2005).
8. FLA. STAT. § 607.1301(4)(c) (2005).
9. Act Effective Oct. 1, 2003, ch. 2003-283, § 21, 2003 Fla. Laws 2902, 2914-15
(amending FLA. STAT. § 607.1301).
10. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 13.01(4)(iii) (2005); FLA. STAT. § 607.1301(4)(c) (2005).
There was concern over the issue of appraisal rights by Florida Governor John Ellis "Jeb"
Bush that the change proposed to eliminate minority discounts was designed to affect the
outcome of a certain pending lawsuit. Letter from Jeb Bush, Governor, State of Florida, to
Glenda E. Hood, Secretary of State, Florida Department of State (June 20, 2005), available at
http://www.flabuslaw.orglindex.php?/Ilist.comnittees=4/1 (follow "Gov. Bush 6/20/05 Letter
re SB 1056/HB 595" hyperlink under "Committee Documents") [hereinafter Bush Letter]. He
was assured by State Represenative J. Dudley Goodlette that the legislation was not designed
to do that, but rather, as Representative Goodlette wrote:
I am comforted by the fact that provisions substantially like those amendments, derived from
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, had been unsuccessfully introduced in earlier
legislative sessions and the Florida Bar's Business Section was only attempting to gain their
passage this time around. In fact, I was one of the sponsors of that earlier legislation. Thus, I
am assured that this was the sole motivation of the Florida Bar members involved in the draft-
ing, analysis and editing of the amendments.
Letter from J. Dudley Goodlette, Representative, District 76, State of Florida, to Jeb
Bush, Governor, State of Florida (June 17, 2005), available at http://floridataxlawyers.
org/pdf/goodletteSB 1056HB595_business-entities.pdf [hereinafter Goodlette letter].
[Vol. 30:3:333
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The official commentary to the RMBCA states that the statutory ap-
praisal remedy for shareholders should be available:
only when two conditions co-exist. First, the proposed corporate
action as approved by the majority will result in a fundamental
change in the shares to be affected by the action. Second, uncer-
tainty concerning the fair value of the affected shares may cause
reasonable persons to differ about the fairness of the terms of the
corporate action."
This means, generally, that the appraisal remedy is available in mergers,
share exchanges, and dispositions of assets other than in the ordinary course
of business. 2 Moreover, the new provisions reinstall a market exception for
publicly traded companies. 3 Specifically, the new provisions deny appraisal
rights in connection with any class of shares that is "[1]isted on the New
York Stock Exchange [NYSE] or the American Stock Exchange [AMEX] or
designated as a national market system security.., by the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers [Automated Quotations] [NASDAQ]," or that is
held by 2000 or more shareholders and has a public float (number of shares
that are outstanding) "of at least $10 million, exclusive of the value of such
shares held by its subsidiaries, senior executives, directors, and beneficial
11. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 13.01 cmt. 1 (2005). Florida first adopted a modified ver-
sion of the Model Business Corporation Act, former Florida Statutes Chapter 607, in 1975.
FLA. STAT. ch. 607 (1975). Chapter 89-154, Laws of Florida, created the Florida Business
Corporation Act, the current Florida Statutes Chapter 607. See FLA. STAT. ch. 607 (2005).
This legislation, effective July 1990, revised, updated, and organized Florida Statutes Chapter
607. Id. It substantially followed the provisions of the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act ("RMBCA") adopted by the American Bar Association in 1984. Chapter 607 was
amended several times during the 1990s and early part of 2000. Specifically, Florida's dis-
senter's rights statute granted by Florida Statutes Chapter 607 was intended to protect share-
holders against coercion, in majority-approved transactions that radically altered the nature of
their investment in a corporation, by enabling them to dissent formally from certain funda-
mental corporate changes and demand payment from the corporation for the fair value of the
shares. The then revised statute, which set forth what corporate actions gave rise to dis-
senter's rights, was based in part on existing Florida Statutes, and incorporated certain provi-
sions of the RMBCA and the Georgia Business Corporation Code. Generally, the revised
dissenter's rights statute filled the procedural gap left in the prior statute by providing proce-
dures and time limits for both the corporation and the dissenting shareholder. If the dissenting
shareholders fail to comply with the statutory requirements, their right to determine fair value
of their shares terminates and they are bound by the corporate action. See generally Michael
V. Mitrione, Dissenters' Rights, in FLORIDA CORPORATE PRACTICE § 11.1 (4th ed. 2002).
12. FLA. STAT. § 607.1302(1) (2005).
13. § 607.1302(2)(a).
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shareholders owning more than 10 percent of such shares."' 4 The reason is
that with such liquidity the minority shareholders have a ready market for
their shares.
II. FLORIDA'S RIGHT OF APPRAISAL
A Florida statute carving out corporations with ten or fewer sharehold-
ers does not make sense. There is likely no market for shares in a corpora-
tion with eleven, twenty, or fifty shareholders. The logical distinction is
whether there is an established market for the shares to ensure liquidity. This
is the distinction drawn by the RMBCA. 5 If there is a ready market, there is
no need for the appraisal remedy; if there is not, there should be no minority
or marketability discounts applied.
A. Dissenter's Right Application
Under Florida Law, the right to appraisal applies to the following types
of corporate actions: first, the consummation of a merger or conversion re-
quiring a shareholder vote;' 6 second, upon disposition of assets requiring a
shareholder vote with certain exceptions; 17 third, "[c]onsummation of a share
exchange;"'" fourth, amendment to the articles which reduces the share-
holder's ownership interest to a fractional share;19 fifth, upon certain amend-
ments to the articles of incorporation merger and the like;2  finally, with re-
spect to a class of shares existing prior to October 1, 2003, which negatively
affects the shareholder in specified ways.2'
Under section 607.1302(1), shareholders who are entitled to vote on a
corporate action-whether because such shareholders have general voting
rights or because group voting provisions are triggered-are not entitled to
appraisal if the change will not alter the terms of the class or series of securi-
14. Id. Note that the RMBCA uses a $20 million float. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
13.02(b)(l)(ii) (2005). Delaware law contains a market exception that is quite similar to the
1998 amendments to the RMBCA except that Delaware law contains no float requirement.
There are several important exceptions to the market exception under the RMBCA and the
Florida Statutes. See generally FLA. STAT. § 607.1302(2)(c)-(d) (2005); Richard A. Booth,
Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings, 57 Bus. LAW. 127
(2001).
15. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02 cmt. 2 (2005).
16. FLA. STAT. § 607.1302(l)(a) (2005).
17. § 607.1302(l)(c).
18. § 607.1302(1)(b).
19. § 607.1302(l)(d).
20. § 607.1302(l)(e).
21. § 607.1302(l)(f).
[Vol. 30:3:333
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ties that they hold.22  Thus, statutory appraisal rights are not available for
shares of any class of the surviving corporation in a merger or any class of
shares that is not included in a share exchange.
B. General Considerations
A voluntary dissolution will not trigger an appraisal remedy because
such an action does not affect liquidation rights-the only rights that are
relevant following a shareholder vote to dissolve. Moreover, the new provi-
sions also eliminate appraisal in connection with amendments to the articles
of incorporation, with some grandfathering.23 Instead, the amended statute
permits corporations to delineate a list of transactions for which the corpora-
tion may voluntarily choose to provide appraisal by permitting a provision in
the articles of incorporation that eliminates, in whole or in part, statutory
appraisal rights for preferred shares.24
Generally, the value of a corporation as a whole should be determined
on the basis of what a willing purchaser, in an arms-length transaction,
would pay for the entity as an operating business.2' However, valuation
should take into account all relevant "factors, such as market value, asset
value, [going concern value and] future earning prospects .... After these
factors have been [evaluated] . . . they should then be weighed as to their
relative bearing upon the ultimate question of the fair value of the stock.
'
"
26
A shareholder "usually has a statutory right of ... appraisal" in a statutory
merger.27 "That is, a stockholder [typically holding a minority interest] who
objects to the terms of a merger may demand to be paid in cash the fair value
of his or her shares exclusive of any gain or loss that may arise from the
merger itself.,
21
22. See§ 607.1302(1).
23. § 607.1302(1)(e)-(f) (discussing a class of shares prescribed in the articles of incorpo-
ration prior to October 1, 2003).
24. Id.
25. 12B WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5906.120 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2000). See generally, Timothy K. Bronza,
Reg'l Dir., Mgmt. Planning, Inc., Business Valuation for Corporate Law Practice (Feb. 16,
2005) (presentation to Corporate Finance class at Nova Southeastern University),
http://www.nsulaw.nova.edulfaculty/courses.cfm?ID=17 (follow "Business Valuation of the
Corporate Law Practice" hyperlink).
26. 12B FLETCHER, supra note 25, § 5906.120.
27. See Booth, supra note 14, at 127.
28. Id.
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C. Appraisal Remedy Purpose
The purpose of an appraisal is to ensure that "the price paid in a merger
is a fair one."'29
Most courts and commentators seem to agree that it is inappropriate to
apply a minority discount in the context of an appraisal proceeding
even though the fair market value of minority shares may be less than
the going concern value of those shares.... Thus the appraisal rem-
edy is founded on the possibility that market prices may be wrong. As
the Delaware Supreme Court has stated, the goal of an appraisal pro-
ceeding should be to determine the value of the corporation as a whole,
not the value of particular shares, and to award the found value per
share to all dissenting stockholders. 30
Thus, Delaware does not apply discounts in corporate appraisal pro-
ceedings.3 ' Moreover, the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance defines
fair value as the value of the shareholder's "proportionate interest in the cor-
poration, without any discount for minority status or, absent extraordinary
circumstances, lack of marketability.
'3 2
Minority shareholders are still shareholders. 33 The fact that a share-
holder is unlikely to exercise control is no reason to ascribe a diminished
value to her shares in a transaction which is involuntary as to such share-
holder.
In contradistinction to commentators, numerous state legislatures, and
state judicial interpretations, Florida's new statutory definition of "fair
value" omits the Model Act's proscription of a minority or marketability
discount except with respect to corporations with ten or fewer shareholders.34
This has opened the door to a multitude of disadvantageous results for the
minority shareholder seeking an appraisal remedy. Florida's revised statute
clearly goes against the overwhelming trend not to apply discounts in ap-
praisal proceedings generally.
Although many courts and commentators use the terms minority dis-
count and marketability discount more or less interchangeably, the two
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144-45 (Del. 1989).
32. 2 PINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
7.22 (1992).
33. Booth, supra note 14, at 127.
34. See Act effective June 20, 2005, ch. 2005-267, § 2, 2005 Fla. Laws 2425, 2434.
[Vol. 30:3:333
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are really quite distinct from each other. The idea of a minority dis-
count does not properly refer to the fact that minority shares ordinarily
will trade at a price that is less than the price that a controlling stock-
holder might command in a sale of control. Rather, the term minority
discount as properly understood refers to a discount from the price that
would be set for non-control shares in an active market simply because
they are minority shares and have no power to influence the govern-
ance of the corporation .... 35
Conversely, "a marketability discount refers to a discount from what a fair
trading price would be if there were an active market for the shares."36 Mar-
ketability discounts can also affect owners of large blocks of shares due to a
difficulty in the resale process "without affecting the market price."37
The 1998 Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) states,
among other things, that discounts are inappropriate in appraisal transactions
as a whole.38 The RMBCA defines fair value as:
the value of the corporation's shares determined:
(i) immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to which
the shareholder objects;
(ii) using customary and current valuation concepts and techniques gener-
ally employed for similar business in the context of the transaction requir-
ing appraisal; and
(iii) without discounting for lack of marketability or minority status .... 39
The drafters of the Model Act determined that discounts for marketabil-
ity or minority status are unsuitable because transactions which trigger ap-
praisal rights are those affecting the entire corporation, and such transactions
could not be prevented by minority shareholders.' ° This would result in a
double-whammy for the unfortunate minority shareholder. Not only can she
not prevent the transactions, such as a merger, but she is subject to a dimin-
ishment in the proportional value of her shares in what is effectively a forced
sale. Additionally, "the lead-in language ... is ... designed to adopt the
more modem view that appraisal should generally award a shareholder his or
35. Booth, supra note 14, at 130-31.
36. Id. at 131.
37. Id.
38. MODEL Bus. COrn. ACT § 13.01 cmt. 2 (2005).
39. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) (emphasis added).
40. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 13.01 cmt. 2.
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her proportional interest in the corporation after valuing the corporation as a
whole, rather than the value of the shareholder's shares when valued
alone."'
The discounts can have a profound impact. For example, a combined
thirty percent minority interest discount and forty percent discount for lack of
marketability, which may be applied by appraisals, would render an eight-
share valued at $10 to be valued at $4.20. For example:
$10.00 Control Value per share
-3.00 Less minority interest discount (.30 x $10.00).
$7.00 Marketable minority value
-2.80 Less lack of marketability discount (.40 x $7.00)
$4.20 Per share value of non-marketable minority shares42
D. American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance
The ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance states "that the fair
value of shares in an appraisal proceeding should be determined 'without any
discount for minority status or, absent extraordinary circumstances, lack of
marketability." '4' It also states that the value should be determined "in the
context of the transaction giving rise to appraisal" and further states that
"'[t]his standard does not necessarily imply... that fair value should be de-
termined by the presumed outcome of a hypothetical competitive auction."
45
The ALI's official comment states that the "role of the appraisal remedy is to
assist shareholders to police conflicts of interest that may arise in connection
with the sale or disposition of [a] firm. In the absence of a conflict of inter-
est, less policy justification exists for upsetting the bargain reached between
[the buyer and seller.]"46 Typically a court would not reform a contract to
disturb the price set by the contracting parties, absent unconscionability.47
41. Id. "If, however, the corporation voluntarily grants appraisal rights for transactions
that do not affect the entire corporation-such as certain amendments to the articles of incor-
poration-the court should use its discretion in applying discounts if appropriate." Id.
42. See Linda B. Trugman, Trugman Valuation Assocs. Inc., Business Valuation, http:l/
nsulaw.nova.edu/faculty/syllabi/Novalawcorpfintrugman.ppt (last visited Mar. 11, 2006).
43. Booth, supra note 14, at 136 (quoting 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.22 (1992)).
44. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.22
(1992).
45. Id. at 136-37 (quoting 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 7.22 cmt. d (1992)).
46. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.22 cmt.
c (1992).
47. See id.
[Vol. 30:3:333
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Accordingly, the ALl principles provide that "the court should give substan-
tial deference to the board's judgment [as to price per share] unless the plain-
tiff can show by clear and convincing evidence that the board undervalued
the firm.
' ' 8
H1. OPPRESSION STATUTES
With the notable exception of Florida, almost all states have passed leg-
islation to provide remedies to shareholders who are opposed, including the
possibility of seeking dissolution." The corporate statute that most states
adopt is the RMBCA "which focuses on the 'illegal, oppressive, or fraudu-
lent' actions by the majority shareholders."50 A remedy for oppression has
been deemed appropriate in most states because oppressed minority share-
holders have no liquidity or other means of redeeming their equity in closely-
held corporations.1 In addition, there are a number of court-created defini-
tions of oppression, some broad and some more narrow. 2 Moreover, the
case law is usually very fact specific which leads to unpredictability for mi-
nority shareholders seeking a remedy. 3
Because of the nature of a closely-held corporation, "some courts have
imposed a [partnership-like] fiduciary duty among [the] shareholders."54 The
same dilemma of ascertaining "fair value" arises in the context of a buyout
"[w]hen a majority shareholder is ordered (or elects) to buy out the shares of
an oppressed minority shareholder."" The dilemma of the "fair value" of the
minority stake is presented in the same manner as with an appraisal action.
5 6
While "there is widespread support for a fair value buyout as a[n] .. .op-
pression remedy, there is significant disagreement [as to] what fair value
means."
57
48. Id.
49. See Joseph W. Bartlett & Kevin R. Garlitz, Fiduciary Duties in Burnout/Cramdown
Financings, 20 J. CORP. L. 593, 614 (1995).
50. Id. (citation omitted).
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and "Fair Value": Of Discounts, Dates,
and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 DuKE L.J. 293, 304 (2004).
55. Id. at 310.
56. Id. at310-11.
57. Id. at310.
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A. Florida Law
The Florida Legislature revised Florida Business Corporations Act's
("FBCA") definition of fair value in 2003.58 Prior to that revision, the FBCA
defined fair value as "the value of the shares as of the close of business on
the day prior to the shareholders' authorization date, excluding any apprecia-
tion or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless exclusion
would be inequitable."59 The 2003 revised definition mirrored that of the
RMBCA version; however, it excluded the express proscription of discounts
for lack of marketability or minority status.6° The act, as revised, defined fair
value as:
[T]he value of the corporation's shares determined:
(a) Immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to
which the shareholder objects.
(b) Using customary and current valuation concepts and tech-
niques generally employed for similar businesses in the context of
the transaction requiring appraisal, excluding any appreciation or
depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless exclu-
sion would be inequitable to the corporation and its remaining
shareholders. 61
In examining both versions, it is quite apparent that the 2003 Florida
legislature did not follow the overwhelming trend with regard to the minor-
ity/marketability discount issue.
In 2004, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal held in a dis-
senter's rights action that "'Florida's dissenters' rights statutes are based, in
part, on the [RMBCA] ... [t]herefore, we may look... to cases from other
jurisdictions that have adopted the provisions of the RMBCA in substantially
the same form., 62 While one can argue that, based on the foregoing, one
could look to other jurisdictions for guidance as to whether marketabil-
ity/minority discounts should apply, a counter-argument could be made un-
58. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1301(4) (2003).
59. FLA. STAT. § 607.1301(2) (2002).
60. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) (2005); Act effective Oct. 1, 2003, ch. 2003-
283, § 21, 2003 Fla. Laws 2902, 2914.
61. FLA. STAT. § 607.1301(4) (2005).
62. Boettcher v. IMC Mortgage Co., 871 So. 2d 1047, 1052 n.5 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (citation omitted). While this case involved the interpretation of the fair value as de-
fined under § 607.1301, it was limited to the "'appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of
the corporate action' element of the definition. Id. at 1052 (quoting FLA. STAT. §
607.1301(2) (1999)).
[Vol. 30:3:333
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der the statutory interpretative cannon of expressio unius est exclusio alteris,
expressing one item of an associated group or series to another left
unmentioned. In its 2003 revision, the Florida legislature generally adopted
the RMBCA definition of "fair value" with the significant exception of its
exclusion of its proscription against minority/marketability discounts.63 Ob-
viously, this was no oversight by the Florida Legislature.
In fact, the Florida House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Sub-
stitute for House Bill 1623 as initially proposed in 2003, included the current
definition of "fair value" with the following addition: "(c) Without discount-
ing for lack of marketability or minority status except, if appropriate, for
amendments to the articles of incorporation pursuant to s. 607.1302(1)(e) or
circumstances in which not discounting for marketability would be inequita-
ble to the corporation and its remaining shareholders."' In other words, as
originally proposed, Florida's language followed the RMBCA by eliminating
discounting by statute; however a subsequent amendment removed the text
from the proposed bill.65 The reason for this remarkable change in 2003 is
not evident from the official legislative history.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc.
In 2003, in Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc.,66 the Supreme Court
of Colorado addressed the meaning of fair value in determining sharehold-
ers' interest under its state corporation statute.67 Like Florida, Colorado
based its statute largely on the Model Business Corporation Act.68 This case
provides an excellent discussion of the applicability of discounts in appraisal
proceedings.69 The Colorado statute at bar was not the recently updated
RMBCA definition of "fair value," but rather the older, more general version
that did not explicitly address marketability/minority discounts.70 In render-
ing its decision, the court held that: 1) "the meaning of 'fair value' is a ques-
tion of law, not an issue of fact to be [determined] ... on a case-by-case ba-
sis; ' 71 2) fair value under the state statute is not fair market value;72 3) "fair
63. FLA. STAT. § 607.1301(4) (2003).
64. Fla. CS for HB 1623, § 21 (2003) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 607.1301).
65. See id.
66. 63 P.3d 353 (Colo. 2003).
67. Id. at 356.
68. Id. at 368.
69. See id at 360.
70. See id. at 358-60.
71. Pueblo Bancorporation, 63 P.3d at 360.
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value is the shareholder's proportionate interest in the value of the corpora-
tion;, 73 and 4) "a marketability discount should not be applied at the share-
holder level to determine the 'fair value' of the dissenter's shares. 74
In Pueblo, the plaintiff brought an action to determine the fair value
of a minority shareholder's interest under the state statute, challenging the
value assigned after the lower court applied a minority and marketability
discount in a cash-out merger.75 In holding that the meaning of fair value is a
question of law, the court rejected the case-by-case approach stating that it
was "too imprecise to be useful to the business community., 76 This impreci-
sion creates a problem for parties because they may not know what the trial
court is, in fact, valuing. 77 For example, does the trial court, seeking to de-
termine what is "fair," award the shareholder the value of proportionate in-
terest in the corporation or the value of his minority shares? In an arms-
length transaction, willing buyer-willing seller situation, the buyer would
likely seek discounts for both marketability and minority status. However,
should that apply to the transaction, triggering the appraisal remedy transac-
tion, which is involuntary as far as the minority shareholders are concerned?
The differences between the two measures is the most significant vari-
able between the two measures (i.e., proportional or based on specific shares)
in the appraisal process; however, the Colorado court said that "the [trial]
court's choice of which interpretation to adopt is largely determined by" the
most persuasive expert.78 Both corporations and dissenting shareholders are
disadvantaged by the case-by-case approach which is subjective, unpredict-
able, and encourages unnecessary, costly litigation.79 The court also held
that the legislature could not have intended the definition of fair value to
vary from court to court.80 In holding that the Colorado legislature did not
intend "fair value" to be synonymous with "fair market value" it stated that
"[iun the sixty year history of Colorado's dissenters' rights statute, the meas-
ure of compensation has changed from 'value' to 'fair value,' but the legisla-
ture has never required that dissenters to be paid 'fair market value."''
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 356.
76. Pueblo Bancorporation, 63 P.3d at 361.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Pueblo Bancorporation, 63 P.3d at 361.
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Since Colorado's adoption of the MBCA standard of fair value and sub-
sequent revisions, the definition has remained intact.82 In holding "that the
proper interpretation of fair value is the shareholder's proportionate owner-
ship interest in the value of the corporation, without discounting for lack of
marketability," the court held that the object of the dissenters' rights statute
should be to compensate the minority shareholders for what they lost, which
is their proportionate interest in the whole corporation as a going concern.83
The Court thus held that "[a] marketability discount is inconsistent with this
interpretation."' " Moreover, the court also determined that a discount for
minority status was also inappropriate. 5 "'Such a rule would inevitably en-
courage corporate squeeze-outs.' '8 6 The court also looked to other jurisdic-
tions for the interpretation of fair value and found that most determined "fair
value" in the appraisal context as a proportion of ownership without dis-
counts.8 7
The Colorado court found that, because the language at bar from the
MBCA was nearly identical to that in many other statutes and because such
language is based on a Model Act designed to promote uniformity among
state corporation laws, the interpretation by other state courts on this issue
was particularly persuasive.8 Citing "the leading case regarding discounts,"
the court concluded that:
[T]he appraisal process is not intended to reconstruct a pro forma sale
but to assume that the shareholder was willing to maintain his invest-
ment position, however slight, had the merger not occurred. Discount-
ing individual share holdings injects into the appraisal process specula-
tion on the various factors which may dictate the marketability of mi-
nority shareholdings. More important, to fail to accord to a minority
shareholder the full proportionate value of his shares imposes a penalty
for lack of control, and unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who
may reap a windfall from the appraisal process by cashing out a dis-
senting shareholder, a clearly undesirable result.8 9
82. Id. at 368. "Fair market value is typically defined as the price at which property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller when neither party is under
an obligation to act." Id. at 362 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 363.
84. Id. at 364.
85. Pueblo Bancorportation, 63 P.3d at 364.
86. Id. (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 364-65, 367.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 365-66 (quoting Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del.
1989)).
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B. Munshower v. Kolbenheyer
In 2004, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal held in a dissolution
action that the fair value of shares of a corporation "rests on determining
what a willing purchaser in an arm's length transaction would offer for an
interest in [a] business."" In rendering its decision, the court held that "Flor-
ida case law neither define[d] 'fair value' nor provide[d] criteria by which
'fair value' may be measured."9'
To date, only one Florida appeals court has addressed the issue of mar-
ketability discounts. In 1999, in Munshower v. Kolbenheyer,92 the Florida
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a marketability discount, applied by
the trial court, to reflect the lack of liquidity of the shares in a dissolution
context.93 In Munshower, the plaintiff appealed a final judgment as to ascer-
taining the fair value of shares owned in a closely held corporation, deter-
mining the value of shares of Munshower's stock, and imposing a lack of
marketability discount of twenty percent. 4  In rendering its decision, the
court followed a New York decision, Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc.,9 which
held that "[a] discount for lack of marketability is properly factored into the
equation because the shares of a closely held corporation cannot be readily
sold on a public market.
96
V. CONCLUSION
As amended, the Florida Business Corporation Act's definition of "fair
value" in the appraisal context departs from the latest version of the
RMBCA. The legislation is flawed by under-inclusion. Of course, this does
not preclude a court from determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether or
not to apply a minority or marketability discount in a Florida corporation
with more than ten shareholders. However, "[tihe clear majority trend is to
interpret fair value as the shareholder's proportionate ownership of a going
concern and not to apply discounts at the shareholder level. 97 Moreover, the
90. G & G Fashion Design, Inc. v. Garcia, 870 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2004). This case centered around a dissolution action not involving the issue of minority or
marketability discounts. See id.
91. Id.
92. 732 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
93. Id. at 385-86 (this case was decided prior to the 2003 revision of the FBCA); see
Mitrione, supra note 11.
94. Munshower, 732 So. 2d at 385-86.
95. 486 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
96. Id. at 349.
97. Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 367 (Colo. 2003).
[Vol. 30:3:333
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FBCA departs from the RMBCA in at least one other significant way.
Unlike the RMBCA, the FBCA does not include "oppression" as a ground
for judicial dissolution or other remedy.9" Florida is in a shrinking minority
of states that do not include oppression as grounds for statutory relief.99
Taken together, these two departures from the RMBCA signify that the
FBCA is exceptionally inhospitable, indeed antagonistic, to the interests of
minority shareholders. Counsel should consider this statutory anti-minority
shareholder tilt when determining whether to incorporate clients in Florida or
in some other state. At the least, counsel for minority shareholders should
attempt to address the concerns raised herein in a carefully drafted share-
holders' agreement.
98. See Jeffrey M. McFarland, Florida Corporation Law: Proposed Statutory Relief for
Oppressed Minority Shareholders in Florida, 46 FLA. L. REv. 149, 158 (1994); Marilyn B.
Cane, Oppressive Conduct: Should It Be Grounds for Judicial Dissolution?, Fla. B. Bus. L.
Sec., Q. Rep., Dec. 1993, at 20.
99. See generally F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS: PROTECTING MINORITY
RIGHTS IN SQUEEZE-OUTS AND OTHER INTRACORPORATE CONFLICTS § 3:2 (rev. 2d ed. 2004);
Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations: Oppression, Fiduci-
ary Duties and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 371, 373 (2003).
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